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Elections
ON JUNE 10-13, 2004, voters in the 25 member states elected a new
European Parliament (EP). Five days later, governments agreed on
a Constitution for the EU that reinforces the legislative role of the
EP in numerous areas. This is a unique occasion to reflect on the
evolution of dynamics within the European Parliament and on its
relations with other EU institutions. This Forum gathers four
recognized experts on the EP and European elections to take stock
of changes and continuities in the practices of members of the EP.
First, Niilo Kauppi analyzes the key features on the 2004 election
campaigns, underscoring previous patterns: low turnout in elections
instrumentalized as mid-term elections for the parties in government
and the use of celebrities to gather the vote. Next, Michael
Shackleton revisits the last five years to underline the evolution of
the role of the EP in the institutional triangle with the Commission
and Council. Its increased working relationship with the Council
spurred by the co-decision procedure has the potential to leave the
Commission less influential on shaping policy output. Olivier Costa
focuses on the party dynamics within the EP during the last mandate.
While confirming that voting patterns have not changed drastically,
he observes some changes in coalitions. Finally, Simon Hix looks
towards the future. In his view, although the June results have not
significantly altered the partisan composition of the EP and the
strength of the main parties, he points to the broader picture; a
Center-Right Parliament working with a Council dominated by
Center-Right governments and potentially a Commission with many
Center-Left representatives. The overall Right-wing partisan balance
of three major EU institutions may generate decisions reflecting an
ideological standpoint much clearer to read and comprehend for
the European voters in the 2009 elections.
-Virginie Guiraudon, EUSA Forum Editor
‘Europe’: A Side Issue in European Parliamentary Election
Campaigns
Niilo Kauppi
IT IS A PARADOX, but while the powers of the European Parliament
have increased substantially since the first direct elections in 1979,
electoral participation has plummeted - from 63 per cent in 1979, to
48.4 per cent in 1999, and 45.3 per cent today. The reasons for this
high level of abstention are well known: the political stakes are low,
there is a public lack of knowledge about the issues, and a distrust
of ‘faceless’ Brussels bureaucrats. It is no surprise that in 2004,
party campaigns chose to ‘remedy’ the situation by concentrating
on domestic issues and promoting celebrity candidates in almost
all member states.
Although all member states use proportional voting in European
elections, national variations in the size of the electoral district and
the types of proportional systems used shape candidates’ political
campaigns. In the 2004 twenty-five separate elections for the
European Parliament, voters chose between over 14,600 candidates
vying for 732 seats. The British and Dutch voted first (June 10),
followed by the Irish (June 11), the Czechs (June 11 and 12), the
Latvians and Maltese (June 12), and the Italians (June 12 and 13).
The remaining eighteen member states cast their votes on June 13.
In Germany, Italy and the UK, European elections coincided with
local elections, in Lithuania with presidential elections, in Luxemburg
with parliamentary elections, and in Ireland with a referendum.
Competing media events like the Euro 2004 soccer tournament also
influenced the European vote. In the host country Portugal, the
Euro 2004 tournament totally eclipsed the European Parliament
campaign. As it happens, this contest ended prematurely on June 9
when the top candidate for the opposition Socialist Party died of a
heart attack while on the campaign trail.
Domestic issues and quarrels dominated electoral campaigns
in all twenty-five member-states. Traditionally, European elections
have served as a vote of confidence or no-confidence in the ruling
government and in the European Union as a whole. In Italy and the
UK, campaigns centered on domestic issues and involvement in
the Iraq war. In Italy, the debate turned into a duel between Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi and former President of the European
Commission Romano Prodi. In Spain, the Socialists, having pulled
Spanish troops out of Iraq, continued criticizing the Conservatives
for their war-mongering. In the UK, Prime Minister Tony Blair’s pro-
European line was under fire. Former Labor MP and number-one
candidate in the anti-European UKIP (United Kingdom
Independence Party) Robert Kilroy-Silk called for a withdrawal of
the UK from the EU. In France, the elections turned into a vote of
confidence in President Jacques Chirac’s social and economic
policies. In Sweden as in neighboring Denmark, nationalists and
anti-Europeans challenged the pro-European policies of their
respective governments. Although in general pro-European, the
Swedish public also deeply distrusts the EU, which is seen as a
threat to the welfare state. Only in some member-states like Finland
- the exception that proves the rule - have European elections not
functioned as a vote of confidence in the government. Here, the
issues debated included the fate of social security, EU structural
funds, agriculture, and the future of non-alignment.
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Apart from the war in Iraq, Turkey’s entry into the European
Union was also on the political agenda in many member-states,
notably in Austria, Greece, France, and Germany. Predictably,
the German right CDU-CSU (Christian Democratic Union and
Christian Social Union) opposed Turkey’s accession to the
European Union, whereas the Socialists and Greens on the left
favored it. In Germany, the domestic political calendar also had
an impact on the campaigns. The European elections were the
first electoral contest on a national scale since September 2002,
when Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was re-elected. The next
national parliamentary elections are only in 2006. As in Poland,
where premature legislative elections are anticipated, it seemed
that the German European elections would serve as an ‘ersatz’
for legislative elections.
As to the ten new EU member-states, eight of which are
from the former Communist bloc, an eagerness to join the EU
was coupled with distrust toward Brussels and the older
members. Exceptions were Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, and Slovenia,
all Euro-enthusiasts. The Czech and Slovak electorates, on the
other hand had not overcome their suspicion of politicians and
their broken promises after decades of Communist rule. In the
Czech Republic, the debates revolved around the future of the
European Constitution and the notorious democratic deficit. In
Poland nationalists and ultra-Catholics, who demanded among
other things a reference to Christian tradition in the new European
constitution, set out to challenge the centre-left government.
For the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Brussels
seemed abstract and far away. In Latvia especially, the European
Constitution, domestic political quarrels, and social security
occupied the public’s attention. In some of the new European
Union member states, populist discourse equated Brussels with
Moscow and a loss of national sovereignty.
To grab the attention of absentee voters, parties throughout
the EU recruited non-professional celebrity candidates to their
lists. In Italy, Finland, Estonia, and the Czech Republic, for
example, the candidates and their personal characteristics were
meticulously scrutinized in the press, while important issues
such the European Union’s budget were hardly discussed. In
Estonia, Chanel supermodel Carmen Kass was a top candidate
of the rightist Res Publica list, stating that she wanted to give
‘Estonia a boost’ on the world stage. On the French political
scene, former Finnish MEP, Finnish national icon and world rally
champion Ari Vatanen set up his campaign in the south of France
pole-positioned by Chirac as number two on the center-right list
UMP (Union pour un mouvement populaire). Declaring that he
was not political in the traditional sense of the term, his agenda
consisted of defending the interests of the Provence wine
growers and fishermen.
Due to the eastern enlargement of the European Union, the
defense of the national interest took center stage in several
previous member states. Top politicians, including French
president Jacques Chirac and Finnish Prime Minister Matti
Vanhanen, expressed their concern about the diminished
influence of their countries’ representatives in a larger European
Parliament. The new French election law was also viewed in this
context. Splitting the country into eight electoral districts, it was
partly designed to bifurcate the political spectrum and favor the
largest parties on the left and the right, the Socialists and the
UMP, while disadvantaging smaller parties. To drive the message
home, Chirac appealed ‘in the interest of France’ for voters to cast
their ballots for big-party candidates.
In sum, with opinions split over Europe within political parties,
and no visible political stakes to be fought for, election campaigns
centered on domestic issues and celebrity gimmicks. Indeed, the
Greens were the exception in conducting a European-level campaign.
Ironically, the pan-European issues most widely discussed were
Turkey’s entrance into the European Union and the European
Constitution - two issues outside of the European Parliament’s
competence. Although debates did occasionally make mention of the
bigger issues of foreign policy and security, economic and social
policies, and the national benefits of European Union membership,
they did so only marginally. Indeed, the real political outcome of
these first post-euro and post 9/11 elections will depend not on any
public debate, but on how the winners organize themselves politically
in the post-election phase. Will the Eurosceptics form their own
political group, breaking the dominance of the centre-right EPP-ED
(European People’s Party-European Democrats)? For this, we will have
to wait until the newly elected representatives meet for the first time
on July 20, to assemble a new European Parliament.
Niilo Kauppi is Senior Research Fellow at the
Academy of Finland.
The Interinstitutional Balance in the EU: What has Happened Since
1999?
Michael Shackleton
HOW FAR HAS THE delicate balance between the European Parliament,
Council and Commission been affected by the events of the last five
years since the 1999 European elections and the establishment of the
Prodi Commission?   The answer is of more than academic interest:
the activity and output of the enlarged EU of 25 will be heavily
influenced by the way in which the three institutions interpret their
roles and their relationships with each other.
1999 could be fairly described as the first year of “Euro-
parliamentarism”.1  The Parliament’s role in the institutional triangle
was revolutionized.   In March of that year the report of the Committee
of Independent Experts set up by the EP to examine fraud, nepotism
and mismanagement, notably in relation to the award of contracts,
prompted the collective resignation of the Commission.  The
resignation took place without Parliament adopting a formal motion
of censure but there was good reason to believe that it would have
done so and certainly the Commission thought that it would, if it had
failed to act itself.
Two months later the Amsterdam Treaty came into force and
reinforced substantially the legislative role of the Parliament vis-à-vis
the Council.  The number of areas subject to the codecision procedure
under Article 251 was more than doubled from 15 to 38 (later to be
increased to 43 by Nice) and the procedure itself was revised to
reinforce the level of parity between the two institutions.   Agreement
could now be reached without Council having to adopt a common
position and Council could no longer re-submit its common position
if negotiations in the conciliation committee (the last phase in the
procedure) were unsuccessful.
These events were the prelude to five years that have transformedEUSA Review    Summer 2004    3
the institutional landscape.  Above all, in the legislative domain,
where the three institutions are condemned by the Treaties to work
closely together, the balance has undergone significant change.
Central to this change has been the dramatic reinforcement of the
interaction between the Parliament and Council.  They had already
started to deal with each other more intensively in the Maastricht
era after codecision was introduced in 1993, obliging them to
negotiate face-to-face if agreement was not reached after two
readings.   However, following Amsterdam the number of codecision
and conciliations rose dramatically with 403 legislative acts adopted
up to May 2004, some two and a half times more than had been
approved in the previous five years.2   84 of these acts were adopted
after conciliation between Parliament and Council at a stage of the
procedure when the Commission is restricted by the Treaties to the
role of mediator and can no longer withdraw its proposal.  For their
part, Council and Parliament were obliged to have much closer
contacts as they programmed their work to meet the tight deadlines
laid down in the Treaties.  They had to look for ways to overcome
their differences across a large number of pieces of legislation,
many of them having to be dealt with at the same time.
However, it was not simply the volume of legislation that drove
the two institutions together.  It was also the new provision that
laid down that agreement could be reached at first reading without
Council adopting a common position.   This proved to be much
more than a residual category for non-controversial issues.  Nearly
30% of all codecision legislation between 1999 and 2004 was adopted
in this way, the percentage rising to just under 40% in the last year
of the legislature before enlargement.   Both institutions perceived
that the Community’s legislative procedure could be accelerated in
this way.  At the same time, each Council Presidency could more
readily manage the legislative agenda and establish a scorecard of
the acts adopted during its six-month period in office.  Yet such
management could only work by means of close cooperation
between Council Presidency ministers and officials and Members
of the Parliament, cooperation that now spreads over the whole
legislative period from the emergence of Commission proposals to
the final phase of conciliation.
Moreover, Council came to recognize that it needed to take
into account the likely attitude of the Parliament before it moved
towards a first reading common position.  A classic example was the
Takeovers Directive.  In July 2001 Parliament rejected on a tied vote
the outcome of conciliation negotiations on this highly
controversial piece of legislation.  As a result, the legislative
procedure had to begin again with a new Commission proposal.
The proposal that emerged was one that met strong resistance in
both Council and Parliament but negotiations took place during the
second half of 2003 that allowed a directive to be adopted at first
reading.
Does this mean that the Parliament is usurping the
Commission’s role as the Council’s main interlocutor?  Certainly
the Commission is now at a structural disadvantage, less able to
manage the direction of the legislative process.  This is already
clear at first reading where the Commission retains the right to
modify or withdraw its proposal after Parliament has acted and
before Council adopts a common position.  Such a right is, however,
somewhat theoretical if Council indicates it has a majority to adopt
Parliament’s amendments.  To modify the proposal and thereby
oblige Council to find unanimity would be likely to make the
Commission extremely unpopular.  The Takeovers Directive
underlined the dilemma: Commissioner Bolkestein was strongly
opposed to the deal reached between Parliament and Council but
the Commission as a whole was not prepared to exercise its formal
right to withdraw the proposal.
The temptation for the legislative authority to ride roughshod
over the Commission has also taken more overt forms.  In principle,
there continues to be very broad, though not universal, support for
the Commission to retain its monopoly right over legislative initiative.
However, in practice, there were a number of codecision files where
agreement depended on the legislation specifying when and what
kind of further proposal the Commission should produce.  The
Commission was obliged to issue statements objecting to the
practice and thereby acknowledging its lack of power to prevent an
assertive Parliament from imposing its wishes in this way if Council
could be persuaded that this was the price of agreement.
Parliament’s willingness to contemplate infringing the right of
initiative of the Commission in this way can be dismissed as an
aberration restricted to isolated cases.  However, it can be seen as
part of a wider debate about the nature of parliamentarism at the
European level.   The growth of interaction between Council and
Parliament has proved remarkably successful precisely because it
has enabled MEPs to exercise influence in a way that was not
possible when it depended on the good offices of the Commission
to put its position to the Council or needed Commission support
for its amendments to oblige Council to find unanimity, rather than
a qualified majority, to reject them.  Direct contacts have necessarily
reduced the sense of dependence on the Commission and increased
Parliament’s sense of its own improved status.
This increase in relative status contrasts with the experience
of the Commission.  The Santer resignation sent shockwaves
through the institution, combining a sense of injustice with a
readiness to respond ever more readily to requests from Parliament
to keep it informed in the interests of accountability.   It would be
rash to assume on this basis that the Commission has therefore
effectively replaced Parliament as the junior partner in the
institutional triangle.   The range of the Commission’s
responsibilities include a wide range of tasks, such as leading
international trade negotiations or taking decisions on potential
abuses of competition, where it continues to enjoy a substantial
level of autonomy and relative insulation from the pressures of the
Parliament.   However, five years of “Euro-parliamentarism” have
shown the difficulty of maintaining the traditional balance between
the three institutions.  The assertion of the democratic principle
has served to undermine long-standing conceptions of the roles
that they should each play in the legislative domain, with the
Commission finding itself at a growing structural disadvantage in
the face of a Parliament and Council, increasingly at ease with each
other.
Michael Shackleton is a member of the European
Parliament Secretariat, Brussels3
Transnational Party Dynamics in the EP
Olivier Costa
SINCE 1952, THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (EP) has progressed from
being an assembly, almost devoid of any real power, to being a
“proper” parliament endowed with all the symbolic and institutional4     Summer  2004   EUSA Review
attributes of an assembly in a parliamentary system. The EP has
steadily increased its powers and influence during the IGCs and
thanks to the efforts of the MEPs. But the electorate still does not
feel really concerned, hence the significant low levels of turnout
during EP elections.
Two factors may account for this phenomenon. First, the EP
influence in the institutional system is hardly perceptible, mainly
because there is no partisan link with the Commission. In fact, EP
elections have little impact on EU politics, hence voter apathy.
Secondly, the EP - and more generally speaking the EU - works in a
complex and “consensus-based” way, which does not correspond
to the political traditions of most member states. EU citizens are in
fact shocked by the discrepancy that exists between an institutional
organization close to the Westminster model and the non-
majoritarian nature of EU policy-making.
For many politicians and opinion makers, the main issue is
thus to “normalize” how the EP functions - through reaffirming the
left-right divide, challenging compromises endlessly renegotiated
between the Socialists and the Christian Democrats and creating a
stable majority coalition. Political scientists should be able to provide
interesting lessons. The great majority of researchers and academics
have focused their attention on the study of votes and coalitions in
their approach to the EP, thus collecting a vast amount of data and
detailed research on the cohesion of political groups and coalition
logics within the EP4. Even in the more comprehensive works of
reference that deal with the EP’s contribution to democracy in the
EU, most authors tackle such issues as MEP behavior and coalition
formation5.
These studies highlight the great level of cohesion that exists
within the main EP groups - the Group of the Party of European
Socialists (PES), the Group of the European People’s Party and
European Democrats (EPP-ED), the European Liberal, Democratic
and Reformist Group (ELDR), the Group of the Greens/European
Free Alliance. This may sound surprising given the very national
nature of European elections and the relative weakness of the
European parties. But cohesion and party discipline are particularly
strong - from 60% to 70% on average, which are remarkable results
even compared with national parliaments. Figures are somewhat
lower for the parties with a more anti-Europe dimension, which tend
to be less ideological and more “technical” - the Union for a Europe
of the Nations Group, the Group for a Europe of Democracies and
Diversities, the Confederal Group of the European United Left/
Nordic Green Left. By and large, there has been quite stable cohesion
until recently - with the notable exception of the EPP-ED group in
which British Conservative MEPs, first elected in 1999, vie for more
autonomy.
We should not draw too hasty conclusions from such statistical
studies, especially if we analyze the determining factors in MEP
behavior and party dynamics. Few researchers have reflected on
the very notion of a “political group” when applied to the EP. They
take it for granted that once a group constituted according to the
rules of procedure has shown some form of cohesion, it may then
be compared to any national political group. But they tend to
overlook the irreducible specificities of the EP. The EP political
groups do not stem from strongly organized parties, campaigning
on precise platforms and maintaining strong party discipline in
support of government policies. The supranational dimension of
the assembly, the absence of any genuine “European” party and
the nature of the relations between the EP and the Commission
imply that parliamentary groups have other functions. They are
mainly structures helping to make the functioning of the EP more
rational, gathering MEPs according to their “preferences” and giving
them some practical advantages in the exercise of their mandate.
The role of the groups consists in helping common opinions emerge
rather than to impose them, through negotiations and debates where
the national delegations play a key role.
The word “party discipline” is thus inappropriate. We should
rather speak of statistical cohesion, with few constraints. In fact,
MEPs vote with their groups for other reasons - because common
positions are the result of democratic negotiations or “package
deals”; because they find it impossible to keep track of the multitude
of reports submitted to the EP, and thus rely on their peers’ opinions
(more than 400 legislative acts were adopted during the last term of
office); because the political groups are the main place for socializing;
because cohesion is a necessary condition for the EP’s global
influence; because MEPs are influenced by the weight of national
political traditions and practices.
The study of coalition formation is more complex. Generally
speaking, the EU decision-making process requires flexible
majorities in the EP, according to the various procedures, the issues
at stake or the global context of negotiations. There has never
really been any stable EP majority and majorities are formed for
each vote. The original pro- / anti- Europe cleavage (particularly
strong in the 80s when the PES and the EPP massively voted together
thus assuming some form of “co-leadership” of the EP) gained
momentum up to 1999.
There are three main reasons for this coalition. First, in most
legislative and budgetary votes, an “absolute majority” of all MEPs
- not only those who vote - is required. Second, in the EP institutional
logic, where many actors have a “veto power”, compromise seeking
is the rule. This is especially true for final votes, much less so in the
case of amendments. It also appears that the PES-EPP coalition is
more effective on judicial and environmental problems than on
economic ones.  Finally, we must pay attention to converging
opinions of the PES et EPP on European integration (which was
initiated by the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats) and
on such matters as market integration, institutions or the Common
Agricultural Policy.
Such a left-right alignment does not prevent political
oppositions within the EP. In the 1994-1999 period, there was
generally a right-wing alternative majority (an EPP-ELDR coalition)
when no agreement could be found in the centre. According to
analysts, the surprising victory of the EPP in 1999 meant the end of
the alliance with the PES, as illustrated by the agreement passed
between the EPP-ED (extended to the British Conservative MEPs)
and the ELDR with a view to gaining the EP presidency which was
to be held by the PES according to a “technical agreement” between
the PES and the EPP.
But such an analysis should be more nuanced, for three main
reasons. First, there has not been any dramatic fall in the number of
joint PES/EPP-ED votes. As we mentioned earlier, both groups still
vote along the same lines; this concerned 70% of the cases in the
early stages of the term of office. The slightly lower rate of
convergence at the end of the term may partly be explained by the
approaching elections, thus inciting MEPs to give a better and
more militant image of their activities, that is more in accordance
with the expectations of their electorate.
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economic and socio-political questions, and become more explicit
in single majority votes, and finally, the ELDR now plays a pivotal
role.
The impression of persistent converging opinions as expressed
in the way the two main groups vote may thus be misleading and
should not hide a growing left-right cleavage on a greater number
of issues.
It is hard to speculate on the future evolution of the EP. EU
enlargement, the results of the EP elections and their potential
influence on the appointment of the new Commission, together
with the possible ratification of the Constitution could drastically
alter partisan dynamics within the EP, both in terms of cohesion
and party relations. Though a bipolar organization is unlikely, we
may well witness in the short term the formation of one or several
stable alternative coalitions, on various matters, and the emergence
of a stronger partisanship dimension in the relations between the
EP, the Council and the Commission.
Olivier Costa is CNRS research fellow at the Institute
of Political Science in Bordeaux
The Prospect of ‘United Centre-Right Government’ in the EU
Simon Hix
THE IMPACT OF THE 2004 European elections on the political balance
inside the European Parliament was marginal.  The balance between
the centre-left and centre-right in the ‘Sixth’ directly-elected
European Parliament’ (2004-09) will be almost identical to the balance
in the ‘Fifth’ Parliament (1999-04).  In both the outgoing and incoming
parliaments, the three groups on the centre-right (in the EPP, ELDR
and UEN) control about 50 percent of the seats, and the three
groups on the centre-left (PES, Greens and Radical Left) control
about 40 percent of the seats.
However, the relationship between the centre-left and centre-
right forces inside the Parliament and the political forces inside the
EU’s other two policy-making institutions - the Council and the
Commission - is likely to be profoundly different in this Parliament
compared to the last.  There are two reasons for this.
First, whereas for most of the Fifth Parliament the Council was
dominated by governments controlled by parties on the centre-left,
for most of the Sixth Parliament the Council looks set to be dominated
by governments controlled by parties in the centre-right.  In July
1994, Social Democrats and Greens were in government in twelve of
the then fifteen member states.  In July 2004, in contrast, in fifteen
of the now twenty-five governments are dominated by parties on
the centre-right.  This transformation in the political complexion of
the Council is not simply a result of enlargement of the EU to ten
new member states, since about half of the new member states have
centre-left governments.  Rather, this change results from the natural
pendulum swing of government make-up in the fifteen existing EU
states.
Second, whereas the 1999-04 Commission was the first to be
dominated by centre-left politicians, the 2004-99 Commission will
be dominated by centre-right politics.  This is not simply a function
of the changing colour of the governments in the Council, who pick
the Commissioners.  Another factor is that the next Commission will
be the first to be appointed under the provisions of the Nice Treaty;
where each member state has only one Commissioner.  Under the
previous rules, most governments in the big member state appointed
one Commissioner from the left and one from the right.  Hence, even
if the Council was dominated by one political force, the Commission
would usually be more politically balanced.  However, this time, the
Commission will exactly reflect the political make-up of the Council
at the time of the appointment of the Commission (in the autumn of
2004).  As a result, whereas twelve of the twenty members of Prodi
Commission were either Socialists, Greens, or Left-Liberals (Prodi
himself), the next Commission will probably contain fifteen out of
twenty-five politicians from the centre-right - and may even have
seventeen centre-right politicians if new centre-right governments
emerge in Poland and the Czech Republic before the Autumn.
Hence, for most of the 1999-04 Parliament the EU experienced
by what scholars of US government would call ‘divided
government’, or what scholars in France would call cohabitation:
with a Parliament dominated by the centre-right and the Council
and Commission dominated by the centre-left.  This had significant
implications.  In this period, the largest party in the Parliament, the
EPP, behaved like the ‘official opposition’ in the EU: opposing policy
and legislative initiatives from the Council and EPP as a matter of
principle.  This was exacerbated by the fact that the dominant
national party in the EPP, the German Christian Democrats (who
controlled the leader of the EPP and many of the most senior figures
in the party group) were furious with the Gerhard Schröder for picking
two left-wing Commissioners from Germany.  Hence, the largest
national delegation in the European Parliament, in the largest party
group, was not represented in either the Council or the Commission.
In contrast, in the 1999-2004 Parliament, the PES group behaved
like a ‘minority government’: eager to support proposals from ‘their’
Commission and Council, but lacking political support in the
Parliament to push these through. Not surprisingly, this period was
marked by several high-profile political battles between the
Commission and the Council, on the one side, and the Parliament
on the other: such as the End-of-Life Vehicles Directive, the
Takeovers’ Directive, and the Workers’ Consultation Directive.
Against the expectations of much of the theoretical research on the
EU legislative process - which assumes that the Parliament is more
‘integrationist’ and ‘regulatory’ than the Council, and so is likely to
accept most agreements between the Commission and the Council
- in this period, the majority in the Parliament was often less regulatory
than the majorities in the Council and Commission, and so was
potentially closer to the Status Quo than a more ‘left’ proposals
from the other institutions.  For example, in the adoption of the End-
of-Life Vehicles Directive - which set new environmental standards
in the manufacturing and recycling of cars - the more ‘free market’
EPP-ELDR-UEN majority in the Parliament successfully watered
down the highly regulatory legislative framework that had been
agreed by the ‘Red-Green’ coalition in the Commission and Council.
Relations are likely to be dramatically different in the Sixth
Parliament.  For the first time since the first direct elections of the
Parliament, all three legislative institutions of the EU will be
dominated by a centre-right (Conservative-Liberal) majority.  The
prospect of such ‘united government’ could potential produce a
dramatic change the EU’s policy agenda.  A centre-right coalition,
led by a centre-right Commission President, an EPP or ELDR
President of the Parliament, together with a few key centre-right/
neo-liberal heads of government, could give real teeth to the ‘Lisbon
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implementing the Lisbon agenda through intergovernmental
agreements outside the EU’s legislative procedures has produced
few results.  However, a centre-right coalition across the EU’s
legislative institutions could use the legal instruments in the EU
Treaty, for example by adopting a Directive harmonizing labor market
regulations for small and medium-size enterprises.
An ‘oversized majority’, under the qualified-majority rules,
would still be required in the Council to adopt such legislation.
But, in contrast to the previous parliament, any (liberalizing)
legislative proposal from the Commission and the Council would
almost certainly pass through the Parliament with only minor
amendments.  Also, a Liberal-Conservative coalition would not hold
together on all issues on the EU’s legislative agenda.  Whereas
Liberals (in the ELDR in the Parliament, or in the Council or
Commission) might support Conservatives on market liberalization
issues, they would probably join with the Socialists to block a
social conservative agenda: such as restrictive EU immigration
policies, or anti-environment policies.
If such ‘united centre-right government’ is able to push through
more market liberalizing policies at the European level, what
European voters will think is uncertain.  On the one hand, the centre-
left, who have gradually become more pro-European than the centre-
right in most EU member states, may return to their positions of the
late 1970s and early 1980s, when Socialists opposed the EU in fear
that market integration in Europe would undermine the social
democratic model in many member states.  A liberalizing EU might
be more popular in the UK, but centre-left parties in Continental
Europe and Scandinavia might gradually return to seeing the nation-
state as a means of protecting social and labor regulations against
global capital.
On the other hand, if the EU begins to push a particular political
agenda for a period, Europe’s citizens will be more aware of what
the EU does and that ‘politics’ in the EU can make a difference.
They might even react against the EU governing coalition’s neo-
liberal policies by supporting left-wing parties in the 2009 European
elections - in other words, using European elections to try to
influence the policy agenda of the EU rather than the political agenda
of national politics!
Simon Hix is Reader in European Union Politics and Policy at
the London School of Economics and Political Science
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